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Abstract—Gamma and neutron radiation is produced during the 
normal operation of linear accelerators like Free-Electron Laser 
in Hamburg (FLASH) or X-ray Free Electron Laser (X-FEL). 
Gamma radiation cause general degeneration of electronics 
devices and neutron fluence can be a reason of soft error in 
memories and microcontrollers. X-FEL accelerator will be built 
only in one tunnel, therefore most of electronic control systems 
will be placed in radiation environment. Exposing control 
systems to radiation may lead to many errors and unexpected 
failure of the whole accelerator system. Thus, the radiation 
monitoring system able to monitor radiation doses produced near 
controlling systems is crucial. Knowledge of produced radiation 
doses allows to detect errors caused by radiation, make plans of 
essential exchange of control systems and prevent accelerator 
from serious damages. The paper presents the project of 
radiation monitoring system able to monitor radiation 
environment in real time.  
Index Terms—Controller Area Network, gamma radiation 
dosimetry, neutron radiation dosimetry, Radiation sensing Field-
Effect Transistor, linear accelerator, X-ray Free Electron Laser 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During normal operation of high-energy accelerator like 
FLASH or X-FEL, the gamma and neutron radiation is 
produced as a side effect. Great majority of electronic devices 
and system is sensitive to this kind of radiation. Therefore, 
many researches has been made to estimate radiation 
destructive influence [1]. The results show that the gamma 
radiation is responsible for general degradation of electric 
parameters of devices. As an example in MOS transistors 
threshold voltage, transconductance, leakage current or drain-
source breakdown voltage are affected. The neutron fluence is 
a reason of Single Effects Events (SEE) in memories, 
microcontrollers and others devices.  The SEE can be divided 
into two groups: destructive effects, which cause permanent 
device damage and non-destructive effects, which are 
reversible.  To the first group can include e.g. Single Event 
Latch-Up (SEL), Single Event Snapback (SEB) or Single 
Event Burnout (SEB). The other one is represented by Single 
Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Transient (SET) or Single 
Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) [2, 3]. All mentioned 
factors cause the best solution during designing linear 
accelerators is building two parallel tunnels and place main 
beam pipe and control systems in separated tunnels. 
Unfortunately it dramatically increases costs of project. 
Therefore the newest project carried out at DESY research 
centre - X-FEL will be built in only one tunnel [4, 5]. Thus all 
electronic control systems and devices will be exposed to 
high-energy radiation and that is why radiation monitoring 
system able to measure doses absorbed by electronic devices 
is crucial. The system should be able to monitor radiation 
environment in real time and store measured data for further 
analysis. 
II. RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 
The radiation monitoring system must be able to monitor 
gamma and neutron radiation doses in real time in crucial parts 
of the accelerator tunnel. General block diagram of the system 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of Radiation Monitoring System based on CAN 
It is a distributed system, which consists of three main 
modules:  
1) active radiation detectors 
2) management application 
3) user GUI application 
All components will be briefly described in next parts of the 
paper. The detectors are prepared to be placed near all crucial 
accelerator controlling systems. Both applications are created 
to work on PC computer which must be placed in safe, non-
radiation area. Management application and GUI use TCP/IP 
protocol to communicate between each other and connect to 
database. Therefore GUI software and database can run on 
independent computers, but placed in the same network as the 
Management application. Master Board node, whose main 
task is generating controlling signals essential to proceed hard 
reset of detectors, is also placed in the system. The system is 
designed to work with a maximum number of 60 detectors, 
which will be placed on distance of few hundreds meters in 
 
 
whole accelerator tunnel. Old version of radiation monitoring 
system based on RS232 interface, called RadMon, has been 
designed and installed in FLASH accelerator, which is a 
research facility created to develop technologies necessary for 
X-FEL [4]. RadMon was used to develop and test radiation 
measurement methods, which are also used in described 
system [1]. X-FEL will be around 8 times bigger than FLASH,  
therefore new system capable to operate on bigger distances 
with high reliability is essential. A few communication 
interfaces have been considered to be used. Communication 
standard for distributed radiation monitoring system must 
provide at least three main features: reliability, immunity to 
radiation and electromagnetic disturbance (EMI) and 
possibility to communicate at distances over 1 kilometre. Fast 
transmission rate is not critical demand, because used 
bandwidth will be quite low ( <10kb/s ). All the above 
requirements are fulfilled by CAN (Controller Area Network) 
standard. 
A. Controller Area Network 
The CAN standard was designed for automotive 
application in the late 80‟s, but it can be successfully used in 
other areas. Main goal of creating this protocol was receiving 
fast, flexible, immune, reliable and safe communication 
interface.  Basic features of CAN are: 
1) Fast transmission speeds (up to 1 Mb/s) and long 
distances (up to 10 kilometres) 
2) Differential transmission of data which provide 
immunity to EM disturbances 
3) Broadcast transmission in multi-master system 
4) Message oriented protocol 
5) Effective data correctness and delivery mechanisms 
6) Simple 2-wire bus 
Theoretically there is no limit in the amount of nodes, but in 
practice this number is limited by CAN bus capacity to 
approximately 120. Maximum speed of data transmission 
depends on bus length as it is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2. CAN bus speeds in bus length function 
CAN uses a differential transmission to achieve immunity to 
EMI disturbances.  There are two states of the bus – dominant 
(logical false - 0) and recessive (logical true - 1). The 
dominant state has higher priority than recessive. When two 
devices transmit a different bit (0 and 1) in the same time the 
device, which transmit logical 0 receives the bus and second 
device will wait until bus will be free. This property is used in 
arbitration mechanism [7]. The priority of frame is determined 
by its ID field (see Fig. 4). The lower ID, the higher priority. 
The arbitration process is visualized on Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3. Arbitration process between three CAN nodes 
A CAN network can be configured to support two subtypes of 
standard - CAN2.0A (base frame format) or CAN2.0B 
(extended frame format). The only difference between the two 
format is that CAN2.0B utilize 29-bit length frame identifier 
and CAN2.0A supports only 11-bit identifiers what allows to 
use 2040 (the seven most significant bits (ID-10 - ID-4) must 
not be all ‟recessive‟ ) messages in system, what could be not 
enough in complex applications.  In presented radiation 
monitoring system CAN2.0A is used. There are four frames 
type  defined in CAN standard [6]. 
1) Data frame – frame contains node data 
2) Remote frame – request for transmission of data 
frame with specified identifier field 
3) Error frame – frame transmitted when any node 
detects a bus error  
4) Overload frame – used to provide extra delay for data 
processing between data or remote frames  
Structure of CAN2.0A data frame is presented below. 
 
Figure 4. CAN standard data frame 
 
Start Of Frame (SOF) and End Of Frame (EOF) are markers 
of begin and end of frame. RTR (Remote Transmission 
Request) bit determines if it is data or remote frame. IDE 
(Identifier Extension) bit is used only in CAN2.0B frames and 
it is always dominant in standard frames. DLC (Data Length 
Code) field specifies the amount of data, which will be 
transmitted in the frame. CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check), 
which is added to every data frame is one of mechanisms of 
data transmission validity. CRC and ACK delimiters, EOF 
have fixed form and are used to check frame format 
correctness. In CAN interface method of bit stuffing is used to 
code non-fixed part of frame (arbitration, control, data and 
CRC fields). Bit stuffing automatically inserts a 
complementary bit in the actual transmitted bit stream 
whenever a transmitter detects five consecutive bits of 
identical value in the bit stream. It is essential because the 
whole bit stream is coded in the Non-Return-to-Zero (NRZ) 
format and without bit stuffing transmission synchronization 
could be lost. CAN protocol defines five types of errors, 
 
 
which are automatically handled by CAN controllers.  These 
errors are: 
1) Bit error – every nod during bit sending 
simultaneously monitors state of bus. If detected value is 
different from sent one an error is reported. 
2) Stuff error – error occur when 6th consecutive equal 
bit levels are detected in fields, which are coded with stuffing 
method. 
3) CRC error – error is reported, when CRC calculated 
by receiver is different than CRC received . 
4) Form error – occurs when a fixed-form bit field 
contains one or more illegal bits. 
5) Acknowledgement error – error detected by a 
transmitter whenever it does not monitor a „dominant‟ bit 
during ACK slot. 
CAN standard contains effective methods of error correcting, 
which cause that residual error probability for undetected 
corrupted messages is equal to message speed rate multiply by 
4.7∙10-11 [6]. All this features cause that CAN bus deemed to 
be a very good solution to be used in radiation monitoring 
system, which first of all must be able to reliably work for 
extended periods of time in hard environmental conditions. 
B. Active radiation detector 
To perform measurement of radiation doses a dedicated 
detector, whose block diagram is show in Fig. 5, has been 
designed. 
  Figure 5. Block diagram of radiation detector 
The detector is based on AVR core microcontroller 
AT90CAN32 produced by Atmel. The main reason of 
choosing this device was its built in CAN controller, which 
facilitates implementation of communication in the system. It 
has 32 kB of reprogrammable FLASH memory that is much 
more immune to radiation than e.g. SRAM and is utilized to 
store program and data. Sensor is active which means that 
after measurement it automatically initiates data transmission 
to the Master Node. RadFET and SRAM memory are used as 
a radiation dosimeters [1]. The RadFET dosimeter is a PMOS 
based sensor susceptible mainly to gamma radiation, which 
can be easily used in a digital readouts systems to supply real 
time absorbed doses measurements. The reader circuit 
configuration is shown below. 
  
Figure 6. RadFET reader circuit configuration 
The value of Ids current is constant, therefore the threshold 
voltage is determined by transistor parameters, which are 
affected by radiation. Voltage shift can be easily converted to 
absorbed gamma dose. The sensitivity of dosimeter is a 
function of silicon oxide thickness and can be adjusted 
according to the requirements. The neutron fluence gauge is 
based on special sensitive SRAM where SEUs occur when 
memory is exposed to radiation. The controller constantly 
scans the SRAM to detect all SEUs, which are counted. 
Amount of SEU is directly proportional to  absorbed dose of 
neutron fluence. A Samsung K6T4008 512kB memory has 
high radiation sensitivity what was experimentally proved and 
that is why it is utilized in the project [1]. The last value 
measured by sensor is current temperature in the tunnel, which 
is essential to compensate the RadFET voltage value, which 
depends on temperature. Important part of the detector is reset 
unit. During normal operation in radiation environment 
detector‟s software can stuck or be corrupted due to errors 
caused by radiation. Therefore special hard reset mechanism is 
provided. If system management application detects incorrect 
work of any detector it sends special command to Master 
Board, which via control signals activates reset unit of broken 
sensor. The unit proceeds hard reset by temporary power cut 
off and if corruption is not critical the normal work of detector 
should be restored. As one can notice the detector is based on 
low cost, easy accessible elements. Hence, even if the device 
is permanently damage its replacement is easy and cheap.  
C. System management application 
The system management application is custom-made 
software written in C++ programming language prepared to 
run under Linux OS. It performs the role of Master Node in 
the system and is responsible for:  
1) Receiving and interpreting data from radiation 
detectors. 
2) Sending measurement data to prepared MySQL 
database. 
3) Monitor status of sensors and in case of malfunction 
hard resetting. 
4) Providing TCP/IP server responsible for 
communication with the system user. 
Software uses multithread mechanism to provide reliability 
and fast answers on user demands - see Fig. 7. The main 
thread is responsible for analyzing CAN frames, sending 
measurement data to database, checking status of sensors and 
proceed with the hard reset routine if necessary. It is not 
obstructed by checking CAN bus status, because separated 
thread is responsible for receiving CAN frames, what 
guarantees no frames will be passed over and ignored. The 
TCP/IP server provides interface for system communication 
with „external world‟. 
 
 
Figure 7. Block diagram of Management Application 
It interprets set of commands used to controlling system status 
and behaviour. Server can handle only one client at the same 
time because only one user should have access to all systems‟ 
settings, otherwise decision conflicts can occur. The radiation 
monitoring system is also equipped in logging mechanism, 
which puts logs about important system‟s events like sensor 
status changes or execution of user‟s commands in database. 
The measurement data and logs are accessible thanks to GUI 
application. 
D. System GUI application 
The GUI application is used for visualisation of measured 
radiation doses, status of detectors and other data. The second 
function is providing access to system settings and log 
viewing. Software uses TCP/IP connection to communicate 
with the Management application and database (see Fig. 1). 
The GUI provide three main services: 
1) Real time doses monitoring – Doses are calculated 
with resolution of 1 hour according to the newest 
measurement data from database. The functionality is 
accessible via Diagnostic panel. 
2) Visualization of historical measurement – User can 
create charts with all kinds of measured values (radiation 
doses, RadFET voltage, temperature) with minimum 1 day 
resolution. Function accessible via ReadOut Panel. 
3) Management and service of the System – User can 
start/stop/reset selected sensor. The acquiring of current 
RadFET‟s voltage and temperature is also possible. System 
logs viewer is also available via the same Service Panel 
The GUI contains set of LEDs used to visualize status of all 
detectors, master boards and server and database connection. 
The GUI software utilizes QT libraries. QT is cross platform 
framework available on GNU GPL. Software was developed 
to be use under Linux OS, but it is easily to receive Windows 
or Mac OS versions. The release version of GUI application is 
provided with set of all essential QT libraries and short bash 
script. Therefore user can use this software even if QT is not 
installed on the computer. 
 
 Figure 8. Service panel of GUI Application 
III. RESULTS 
The new version of RadMon system based on CAN 
communication bus has been designed and built. Three 
exemplary detector nodes has been delivered for tests. 
Software generated measurement values (except temperature) 
were used to test the stability of all application and detector 
software due to not accessible radiation source. System was 
under test for 170 hours and during this period no errors were 
observed. Communication within the system run correctly and 
all data has been stored in MySQL database. Database and the 
Management Application was running on one PC and the GUI 
application was connected to the RadMon TCP Server 
Radiation via Internet. The software of some detectors was 
intentionally corrupted to check hard reset mechanism. All 
stacked sensors was reset by System Management 
Application.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The system was tested in laboratory conditions. 
Measurement methods used by radiation detector (RadFET 
and SRAM memories) has been tested in the past and its 
usability has been proved [1]. Thus, system after calibration 
should perform well in target environment, but final 
acceptance tests are still essential. 
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